2000s for Democracy in Belarus: a Decade of Disappointment

January 1, 2010 will not be just the beginning of a new year but the beginning of a new calendar decade. It is a formal and conventional event, but that’s the way our perception is constructed – it is easier for us to view history in decades. Swinging Sixties, Greedy Eighties, Noxious Nineties. The 2000s (or “noughties”) will be a separate segment in systematized history of mankind.

For Belarus, it was a decade of dictatorship. The first full calendar decade under the unlimited authoritarian power of Aliaksandr Lukašenka.

We have entered 2000 under the red-green flag of the Lukašenka regime and leave 2009 with it still over our heads. In the 1990s the key year for Belarus was 1996, when, after the infamous referendum, Belarus turned into a country where the whole power is concentrated in the hands of one man. 2006, with its tragic and disgraceful defeat of the opposition at the presidential elections, has become a landmark year in the 2000s. The lesson we should learn from these years is that 2016 is either unlikely to become the year of Belarus’ liberation from dictatorship.

In 2000, that seems so recent, one might have thought that Lukašenka is there for not a long time. A year, or two, or three, and Belarus will at last be free. Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in 2004 has spread much hope that was not destined to turn into reality. The noughties have been a decade of disappointment for Belarus, a decade which has completely turned Belarus into a very special country on the European continent.

Thirteen years have passed since the coup d’état of 1996. During this time a whole new generation of Belarusians has grown up – another generation of people with Soviet mentality, even though it’s been almost twenty years since the Soviet Union itself doesn’t exist any more. We may remind ourselves of 1957, thirteen years after the Nazi occupation of Belarus has been replaced back by Soviet occupation. By that time the anti-Soviet partisan movement in Belarus and neighbouring Soviet republics has almost completely vanished. Perhaps, this was not least because the society had realized that the Soviets came to stay. The same can be said about today’s Belarus, with its tired, demoralized and split opposition; with the fact that Belarusians have mainly concentrated on consumption and primitive physical survival so that even the economic crisis does not initiate political protest.

In 1999 there could still be doubts, but the noughties have proven one thing to us. Belarus might have gained juridical independence simply following the trend set by Baltic countries and Ukraine, who had really struggled for it. However, we couldn’t have got democracy the same way. A whole range of specifically Belarusian problems came into play: weak national self-identification of the people, lack of political culture and absence of national elite, the unfinished process of formation of the Belarusian nation as such. All the dark legacy of the Soviet age, which might not be so noticeable to an outside observer, has realized its potential in the 1990s and became institutionalized in the 2000s.

Belarus enters 2010 as a very specific European country. A political system that rather resembles the relationship of a feudal and his serfs. An archaic economy, where the government has woken up with reforms twenty years after liberation of the socialist camp and where it is not clear, if there is still something to be reformed. A nation that missed the train of 20th century’s romantic nationalisms and represents a mechanistic community of pragmatic and indifferent people without native language and historical memory.

Any difference is a potential advantage. Belarus may be able to transform its difference into an advantage, to realize its potential as a land untouched by investors in the middle of Europe or as a cradle for a post-nationalistic pluralistic traditionalism. Otherwise this potential will be spent in vain with sad consequences for the country. There is no third option, and there’s not much time left till we find out the answer. It is, of course, necessary to hope for the better, but it may be far more useful to be prepared for the worst.

http://belarusdigest.com/2009/12/30/2000s-for-democracy-in-belarus-a-decade-of-disappointment
Read more...

The Russian Way of Being Free

My article for Novaja Europa about freedom and Russian mentality.




"The severity of Russian laws is balanced by their non-obligatory execution".

Mikhail Saltykov-Shchedrin


Is Russia doomed to be authoritarian? In order to answer this question, we must try to analyze both the Russian mentality and the political history of the country.


Do not mix politics and "mentality"

A common place is the assertion that authoritarianism is a necessary part of Russian mentality, unlike that of other European nations. Thus, the current dire situation regarding democracy and human rights in Belarus is often attributed to the fact that the Belarusian lands have been occupied by Russia for over two hundred years. During this time, it is assumed, oriental authoritarian mentality and manners have been planted in what is now Belarus.

Another common point is the assertion that the seemingly authoritarian mindset has not prevented Japan and Germany from becoming prosperous democracies after the Second World War. Both countries, though not without an external stimulus, have built their "economic miracles" based on economic liberalism.

Thus, it is necessary to distinguish between the possibility of building a social system based on liberal principles and, on the other hand, specifics of business and labour culture (within a liberal economy), which are influenced by traditions and mentality. This also applies to Russia, where traditions of authoritarianism should not be grounds for the idea that Russian people are somehow predisposed to slavery and dictatorship.


In what way are Russians freer than western Europeans?

Western Europeans are accustomed to an institutionalized freedom guaranteed by law and custom. Western liberal legal culture has a long history: from Magna Carta and the medieval German urban communes where "city air makes you free", to women's emancipation and the desire to overcome the effects of racial segregation in the U.S. (as evidenced by Obama's election for president).

Legal culture in Russia has gone through the tragic history of the Mongol yoke and has been forming differently, also influenced by the huge territorial extent of the country. At the core of this culture lays the balance of power between the rigid dictates of the center, on the one hand, and fragmented execution of orders on the regions, on the other side.

At the same time the Russian people have traditionally learned to see a greater importance of "objectivity" and of a justice higher than formal law. The law has traditionally been of poor quality, and therefore required a critical approach. Russians have been able to develop this critical approach to a much greater extent than western Europeans. Law in Russia is not a norm to be executed, but at best a "guideline" or, in some cases, simply an obstacle to be overcome. Western Europeans are not accustomed to such wit and intelligence in relation to execution of laws. A famous Russian proverb says "You can turn the law the way you want" - perhaps in this respect a Russian is more free than a Western person.


The Russian conflict: man versus bureaucrat

Russia has traditionally had an authoritarian and usually irrational government, which hindered realization of the people's potential. The history of Russia is the history of an eternal silent battle between reason and the law, between Man and the Bureaucrat. Because of the poor quality of modern Russian legislation, enormous intellectual and organizational resources used to withdraw assets to offshores and reinvest them back instead of developing the business.

As a result of that, the small island of Cyprus has formally become the second largest foreign investor in Russia. Besides, countries that may potentially be used as offshores are the source for more than half of "foreign investments" into Russia: the Netherlands take 18.6% of the total volume, Cyprus - 16,6%, Luxembourg - 15,1%, the Virgin Islands - 2 8%. Up to USD 300m were being annually spent on bribes and kickbacks in Russia before the crisis. The large scale of tax evasion and license tricks greatly distorts national economic statistics.

There are also "everyday" examples of violations of the imperfect Russian laws. For instance, the prohibition of advertising of strong alcohol is being overcome by advertising vodka brands as mineral water, chocolates or even books - and that openly on TV.

Authoritarianism is considered a distinctive feature of the Oriental mentality, dominating in countries like China or Japan. But that authoritarianism is a functioning one, where people irrevocably subdue to the leader and do not grumble or sabotage the production process like Soviet workers did. Since the Mongol yoke, which largely determined the characteristics of the statehood of Muscovy and its derivative Russia, the Russian mentality is a mentality of a Western man enslaved by an Oriental ruler.

Italian-strike-like protest against the government, silent and motivated rather at a subconscious level, is a feature of such mentality. There is a corrosion of public institutions, but also is the converse: Russian society is capable of self-regulation and self-government. Along with the failing state institutions informal institutions arise. These informal institutions are often even more effective and more fair than the government.


Modern Russia: no czars and no great guiding idea

In modern conditions, where there is no will of the hated lord to be sabotaged, a Russian mind may start treating the legitimate interests of fellow citizens as this "obstacle to overcome". And this can, under certain conditions, become quite dangerous. In some respects such behaviour is demonstrated by the rulers of modern Russia. For the first time in Russian history these people do not feel some transcendental and spiritual mission upon themselves (by will of God Emperor of the Third Rome, the Head of Russian Orthodox Church, Father Czar), nor a secular but still global and pathetic mission (a Global Socialist Revolution, or, conversely, the romantic liberation from communist dictatorship of the early 1990s).

The current Russian leadership has been formed behind the scenes from representatives of middle and lower grades of Soviet and post-Soviet nomenklatura. Now these people do not have a boss over their own head, but are accustomed to act on the same schemes as previously. In such circumstances corruption becomes part of the governing mechanism, the real decision-making is quite different from what is defined in the Constitution. The state itself, among its priorities, pursues primarily the interests business groups close to the Kremlin.

In the 1990s Russia started a transformation towards a market economy and pluralist democracy. However, such transition could turn into stagnation, which apparently happened in this case. In such situation the "adolescence problems" may cause complications and increase the risk of destruction of the Russian state as such. Fortunately, considering statements of President Medvedev, some fractions within the Russian government seem aware of the danger.

Many peolpe speak a unique and special path to democracy and freedom for Russia. Those who use such rhetoric, if they do not aim to justify the de-facto deconstruction of democratic institutions, should really search for ways to make liberal reforms and to redefine the role of the state in relevant Russian national traditions. These traditions, these traits of national character existed before, and are still valid now.

// Novaja Europa
Read more...

Ukraine's orange advance

My newest article for Novaja Europa:

Ukraine's orange advance

These days have been the fifth anniversary of the the Orange Revolution in Ukraine - an event that has for several years shaped the political life in neighbouring Belarus and Russia. The orange color has since then irrevocably obtained a political sense.

Presidential elections in Ukraine of 2004 have turned to a play with a happy ending: a handsome, intelligent, positive Ukrainian-speaking Viktor Yushchenko has in a tense struggle won against the criminal, negative, bad-mannered Russian-speaking Viktor Yanukovych. The actors have picked up stereotypical roles and performed them on stage of the Ukrainian Maidan Nezalezhnosti square live on TV: tense hours and days of the struggle for vote counts, revoting, week-long concerts, demonstrations, the legendary victorious fight of Klitschko wearing an orange ribbon on his shorts, Yuliya Tymoshenko wearing the orange shirt of Shakhtar Donetsk. For many years Belarus and Russia's public political lifes haven't been giving us such a spectacle and the sense that the fate of the country could be decided by ordniary people. The forgotten taste of democracy once again, for only one month, came to our already Soviet-styled dissident lifes.

Supporters of democracy in Belarus and in Russia have perceived Ukraine's Orange Revolution much more emotionally than the Rose Revolution in Georgia a year before that. Georgia was a distant and strange country while Ukraine was here, so close and seemingly similar to us. Many of us watched the developments on the Independence Square via the Internet, came to demonstrations at the Embassy of Ukraine. The Revolution gave a burst of democratic activity in Belarus and Russia. In Belarus this wave broke in late March 2006. In Russia it has faded after several hopelessly undemocratic elections.

After five years, and in anticipation of the Yushchenko's upcoming resignation, we all ask ourselves whether the Orange Revolution has brought Ukraine what we wanted.

Unfortunately, Ukraine did not have its own Mikheil Saakashvili who would have used the window of opportunity for radical reforms and a radical improvement. Coming to power on a wave of enthusiasm, Viktor Yushchenko turned out to be not strong enough, and thus the moment of his election remains the most vivid event of his presidency.

Last five years in Ukraine were marked by infinite tense parliamentary battles, which are being so joyfully mocked by Russian and Belarusian official propagandists. Ukraine kept sinking in corruption, the economy landed in severe crisis. Ukraine has a democracy and poverty, Belarus and Russia are authoritarian and until recently had the dubious illusion of prosperity, which is now disappearing in Belarus. What is better? Ukrainian democratic government works badly. But at least it obeys the Constitution.

Indeed, the strengthening of an effective pluralistic democracy in Ukraine brought to light the overall lack of political culture: the inability to conduct a civilized dialogue between different political parties, the inability to compromise and generate solutions, the readiness to sabotage the functioning of the state. The fact that these phenomena have now so clearly broken out in Ukraine is in the long run still better than the situation in Belarus and Russia. In these autoritarian countries a democratic political culture is not developing at all.

Ukraine shows us the long path we still have before us to reach civilized political standards. While Ukraine is walking this path and while Ukrainians are learning from their mistakes - we have not even started to move. The way the Ukrainian parliament looks today is the way a democratic Belarusian parliament will look in ten years from now. What Western Europeans are trying to teach the Ukrainians now will be what Ukrainians themselves will be teaching us in ten years from now.

Ukraine has managed to avoid what has happened to Russia and Belarus. Censorship and propaganda on television, repressions against the opposition and shamelessly organized vote rigging - five years ago these methods of politics have been clearly set off the agenda in the Ukraine. Our neighbours have passed the test which Belarus failed in 1996.

During these 5 years Russia has finally turned into a sad example of a corrupt authoritarian petro-state, having buried expectations caused by the first relatively promising years of Putin's rule. During these 5 years Belarus has experienced the collapse of hopes for a democratic change in 2006 and was forced to start transformation of its authoritarian regime, for which the Orange Ukraine soon became an important partner and a bridge to the West.

Authoritarianism is ineffective and therefore short-lived and unsustainable. We see it in Belarus, where the existing system of governance has exhausted itself. Sooner or later Russia's rulers will face a similar destiny, perhaps with the same consequences as last time, when a late understanding ended by the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In many ways Ukraine is now more stable state than Belarus or Russia. At least because the question "What will happen after Yushchenko is gone" does not contain this threatening uncertainty as the questions "what will happen after Lukashenka is gone" or "after Putin is gone". Heaven will not fall on earth, the country will not disintegrate, the will be no more revolutions. Yushchenko's victory gave Ukraine additional five years of crystallization of a pluralistic democracy, and none of the current political actors is strong enough to get the country under an authoritarian rule.

On the eve of the presidential elections in 2010 the disposition looks somewhat like a race between Yuliya Tymoshenko and and Viktor Yanukovych. Ironically, but watching Tymashenko's happy chat with Putin automatically makes one wish Viktor Yanukovych, Yushchenko's antagonist five years ago, to be the winner. It will be funny if he actually wins this election. But this victory will not be what it would be in 2004. The country is not the Ukraine of 2004 and well as Viktor Yanukovych is not himself of 2004 any more.


http://n-europe.eu/article/2009/11/27/aranzhavy_avans_ukraine
Read more...